By Hong Yan

洪言

On July 10 local time, a UK-France summit was held in London. Following the summit, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the declaration signed by the UK and France would, for the first time, allow the two countries to coordinate their nuclear forces, calling it a significant leap forward in the UK-France partnership.

當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間7月10日，英法峰會(huì)在英國(guó)倫敦舉行。會(huì)后，英國(guó)首相斯塔默表示，英法兩國(guó)簽署的聲明將首次允許英國(guó)和法國(guó)協(xié)調(diào)核力量，并期待英法兩國(guó)“伙伴關(guān)系的一次重大飛躍”。

According to reports, the UK and France signed the Northwood Declaration , marking the first time the two sides have explicitly agreed to coordinate their respective independent nuclear deterrent forces.

據(jù)報(bào)道，英法雙方簽署了《諾斯伍德宣言》（Northward declaration），首次明確雙方將就各自獨(dú)立的核威懾力量進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)。

A Vanguard-class nuclear submarine with the US-made Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile returns from patrol.

巡邏歸來(lái)的英國(guó)“前衛(wèi)”級(jí)核潛艇，該潛艇搭載了美國(guó)的“三叉戟-2D5”潛射導(dǎo)彈。

As the only two nuclear-armed states in Europe, the UK and France have long pursued very different nuclear strategies. The former builds its nuclear posture around reliance on the US, while the latter insists on maintaining an independent nuclear policy. The timing of the two countries signing a nuclear cooperation agreement and issuing a joint declaration is telling.

作為歐洲唯二擁有核武器的國(guó)家，英法走著完全不同的核戰(zhàn)略路線(xiàn)，英國(guó)以依附美國(guó)為政策主線(xiàn)，法國(guó)則走著獨(dú)立自主的核路線(xiàn)。而此時(shí)兩國(guó)簽署核合作協(xié)議、發(fā)表核合作聲明則耐人尋味。

This move likely reflects a sense of disappointment among European nations regarding the US commitment to regional security. Under the new Trump administration, Washington has been readjusting its strategy toward Europe, and the traditional transatlantic partnership has grown increasingly strained. It can be said that Europe's confidence in the US security guarantee has been partially eroded. As the only nuclear-armed states in Europe, the UK and France moving closer at this moment signals not only their dissatisfaction with Washington but also Europe's determination to enhance its security autonomy, a rare assertion of Europe's independent defense resolve.

英法核合作很有可能反映出歐洲國(guó)家在防務(wù)方面對(duì)美國(guó)的失望。特朗普新一任期內(nèi)調(diào)整美國(guó)對(duì)歐洲戰(zhàn)略，傳統(tǒng)的跨大西洋伙伴關(guān)系漸行漸遠(yuǎn)。可以說(shuō)目前歐洲對(duì)美國(guó)的安全保證失去了部分信心，作為歐洲自己的核武器國(guó)家，英法兩國(guó)此時(shí)走近不排除是為了表達(dá)對(duì)美國(guó)的不滿(mǎn)和歐洲自保的決心，是歐洲在防務(wù)安全領(lǐng)域的一次獨(dú)秀。

France's move to coordinate its nuclear deterrent with the UK may also reveal its lingering ambition, yet limited capacity, to independently lead Europe's security and nuclear defense. On paper, France relies on just four Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines to shoulder its strategic nuclear deterrence, while its air-based nuclear forces mainly consist of Dassault Rafale  fighter jets carrying tactical nuclear weapons. In comparison, this capability still falls far short of Russia's vast and comprehensive triad nuclear strike system. To enhance the effectiveness of Europe's nuclear deterrence, it may prove more practical and efficient in the near term for France to share this burden with a nuclear partner rather than pour immense time, effort, and resources into expanding its own arsenal alone.

這次與英國(guó)協(xié)調(diào)核威懾力量也可能反映了法國(guó)對(duì)獨(dú)立領(lǐng)導(dǎo)歐洲安全防務(wù)尤其是核防務(wù)仍心有余而力不足。單就核力量紙面數(shù)據(jù)看，法國(guó)僅有4艘“凱旋”級(jí)戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)彈核潛艇擔(dān)負(fù)著核威懾的重任，空基核力量則以“陣風(fēng)”等戰(zhàn)術(shù)戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)為主，其體量較之俄羅斯龐大且完整的“三位一體”核打擊體系仍有不小差距。為了提高歐洲核威懾能力的有效性，與其說(shuō)耗費(fèi)大量時(shí)間和精力、投入大量資源提升法國(guó)自身核能力，還不如增加核伙伴、共同分擔(dān)核威懾責(zé)任，這或許是短時(shí)間內(nèi)提升歐洲核威懾能力的最有效方式。

A Rafale fighter jet carries an ASMP-A air-launched nuclear missile under its fuselage.

“陣風(fēng)”戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)機(jī)腹下掛載了一枚ASMP-A空射核導(dǎo)彈。

The UK's embrace of nuclear cooperation with France may well be driven by its long-standing strategy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe. Historically, Britain has often acted as a disruptive force on the European continent, playing the role of a "balancer" that pits the strong against the weak. Relying on its insular geographic position, the UK has maintained a special posture in European affairs, neither fully integrated nor completely detached. When Europe is in a position of relative weakness, Britain tends to actively engage in European affairs to boost its standing and secure its interests. Conversely, when a dominant power emerges on the continent or when Europe as a whole moves toward greater unity and strength, the UK often resorts to political, diplomatic, or economic means to sow discord and hinder European cohesion, thus preventing a united and powerful Europe from threatening its own interests.

英國(guó)迎合法國(guó)核合作舉動(dòng)，有可能是對(duì)歐均勢(shì)策略所致。英國(guó)歷史上一直扮演著歐洲“抑強(qiáng)扶弱”的攪局者角色。憑借其島國(guó)的地理位置，英國(guó)在歐洲事務(wù)中保持著特殊的立場(chǎng)，既不融入，也不脫離，當(dāng)歐洲處于弱勢(shì)時(shí)，英國(guó)往往積極參與歐洲事務(wù)，從中提高自身地位，為自己謀求利益；而當(dāng)歐洲出現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勢(shì)一方，或是歐洲整體趨于團(tuán)結(jié)向上發(fā)展時(shí)，英國(guó)則通過(guò)政治外交和經(jīng)濟(jì)手段給歐洲添堵找麻煩，抑制歐洲的團(tuán)結(jié)發(fā)展，以避免一個(gè)團(tuán)結(jié)強(qiáng)大的歐洲崛起危及自身利益。

It cannot be ruled out that London's high-profile announcement of sharing Europe's nuclear security framework with France is part of a calculated move to position itself to intervene in and influence Europe's security landscape for its gain in the future.

不排除英國(guó)此時(shí)高調(diào)宣布與法國(guó)共擔(dān)歐洲核安全體系，是英國(guó)為了未來(lái)干預(yù)和影響歐洲安全局勢(shì)為其牟利的一步棋。

However, the practical impact of UK-France nuclear defense cooperation is likely to be limited. For nearly six decades, the UK's nuclear strategy has been heavily dependent on the US, so the possibility of the UK detaching from the US nuclear posture to build a truly European deterrence framework with France remains low. Therefore, this latest joint statement with France is more likely a demonstration of the UK's desire to show its stake in European security and reaffirm its place in the European family.

但英法核防務(wù)合作很可能難以實(shí)現(xiàn)實(shí)際效果。近六十年來(lái)，英國(guó)的核軍事戰(zhàn)略對(duì)美國(guó)依附性較強(qiáng)，英國(guó)試圖脫離美國(guó)核作戰(zhàn)體系轉(zhuǎn)而建立與法國(guó)的歐洲核威懾體系的可能性較低。因此，英國(guó)此番與法國(guó)的聯(lián)合表態(tài)，很有可能僅是表現(xiàn)英國(guó)關(guān)乎歐洲安全、是歐洲大家庭一員的姿態(tài)展示。

In the Northwood Declaration, the two countries declared that any adversary threatening the vital interests of either the UK or France may face a joint nuclear response. However, the threshold for what constitutes a threat to vital interests is extremely high, meaning the red line for a joint UK-France nuclear response holds little real strategic deterrent value.

兩國(guó)在《諾斯伍德宣言》提出“任何威脅英國(guó)或法國(guó)核心利益的對(duì)手，都可能面臨兩國(guó)核力量的聯(lián)合回應(yīng)”。但所提及的“威脅核心利益”觸發(fā)門(mén)檻較高，英法聯(lián)合使用核武器的“紅線(xiàn)”并不具備實(shí)際的戰(zhàn)略威懾意義。

Editor's Note: Originally published on thepaper.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.